Inadequate Training in the Use of Non-Deadly Force as the Next Frontier in Federal Civil Liability: Analysis of the Baltimore City Baton Program by DeLeonardo, Brian L.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 26
Number 2 Spring 1996 Article 4
1996
Inadequate Training in the Use of Non-Deadly
Force as the Next Frontier in Federal Civil Liability:
Analysis of the Baltimore City Baton Program
Brian L. DeLeonardo
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
DeLeonardo, Brian L. (1996) "Inadequate Training in the Use of Non-Deadly Force as the Next Frontier in Federal Civil Liability:
Analysis of the Baltimore City Baton Program," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 26 : No. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol26/iss2/4
INADEQUATE TRAINING IN THE USE OF NON-DEADLY FORCE 
AS THE NEXT FRONTIER IN FEDERAL CIVIL LIABILITY: 
ANALYSIS OF THE BALTIMORE CITY BATON PROGRAM 
Brian L. DeLeonardo 
Police officers possess awesome powers. They perform their duties under 
hazardous conditions and with the vigilant public eye upon them. Police 
officers are permitted only a margin of error in judgment under conditions 
that impose high degrees of physical and mental stress. Their general respon-
sibility to preserve peace and enforce the law carries with it the power to 
arrest and to use force - even deadly force. } 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Police officers face one of the most "hostile" work 
environments of any profession.2 Not only is the crime 
rate significant, with over 14.1 million crimes reported 
in 1993 alone,3 but police officers are increasingly likely 
to be involved in physical confrontations with suspects. 4 
Between 1980 and 1989 alone, 1,514 police officers 
were killed or died in the line of duty.5 Additionally, 
police officers have seen their ability to use deadly force 
in apprehending suspects curtailed over the last decade 
through a series of United States Supreme Court deci-
sions.6 This has served to add pressure to officers when 
making the split-second decision of whether to use 
deadly force. Moreover, when police officers use 
deadly force in apprehending a suspect, that decision 
will frequently spark a public outcry, an internal inves-
tigation, and in some situations, a criminal prosecution 
of the police officer. 7 In addition, a police officer's split-
second miscalculation to use deadly force may result in 
a civil suit and large monetary judgment. 8 
Police departments have responded to this difficult 
work environment in two ways. First, police depart-
ments have vigorously worked to ensure that their 
police officers are proficient in the use of firearms and 
knowledgeable in the legal limits for using these weap-
ons. This is accomplished by providing not only the 
initial training in the academy, but also mandating in-
service training and annual certification while the offic-
ers are on the force. 9 This increased training has 
reduced the likelihood of a police officer inappropriate-
ly using deadly force, but by no means has that possibil-
ity been eliminated. Second, police departments have 
focused heavily on finding techniques and weapons that 
effectively and safely allow officers to carry out their 
duties, while minimizing risk of injury to the suspect. IO 
These "non-deadly" weapons include batons, police 
dogs, tasers (stun guns), pepper spray, and hand-to-
hand defense techniques. The demand by police depart-
ments for new and improved non-deadly weapons has 
been so intense that manufacturers work furiously to be 
the first on the market with some new "gadget" to add 
to the police arsenal. II 
Nevertheless, the rapid adoption of non-deadly 
weapons and techniques by police departments has 
been a mixed blessing. While such weapons and 
techniques have substantially reduced the likelihood of 
death in police officer/suspect confrontations,12 they 
have also served to foster a new area of excessive force 
civil judgments based upon the excessive use of non-
deadly weapons and techniques. 13 A primary reason for 
the civil liability in less than lethal force situations is that 
the vast majority of pol ice departments have little to no 
formal rules on the.use of non-deadly force. Strangely, 
unlike the strides made by police departments in the 
deadly force arena, no detailed requirements for in-
service training and annual certification in the use of 
non-deadly weapons and techniques are in place. 14 This 
lack of training and fear of liability has led many 
departments to end the use of some non-deadly weap-
ons altogether. 15 Moreover, the devastating effects of 
these weapons is systematically underplayed, which in 
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many situations has led to many unintended deaths of 
non-violent suspects. 
An overview of the new Baltimore City Police 
Department baton training program provides a good 
basis for analyzing the deficiencies and problems asso-
ciated with the adoption and use of non-deadly weapons 
and techniques. By recognizing the deficiencies in the 
non-deadly weapons training being provided to its 
police officers, the Baltimore City Police Department 
can avoid the civil liability that is sure to follow as courts 
slowly become as demanding on a police officers' use 
of non-deadly weapons as courts have become on the 
use of deadly weapons. 16 
II. MUNICIPALITIES ARE SUBJECT TO FED-
ERAL CIVIL LIABILITY FOR THE USE OF 
EXCESSIVE FORCE BY THEIR POLICE 
OFFICERS BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF 
INADEQUATE TRAINING 
Title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code 
provides a civil tort remedy for citizens who have their 
federal constitutional rights violated by government 
officialsY This federal statutory remedy, which was 
derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was passed 
in order to provide a mechanism for eliminatingKu Klux 
Klan activity in the South by providing a neutral federal 
forum for newly freed slaves to bring claims against 
government officials who violated their civil rights. 18 
Today, section 1983 provides a vehicle for citizens to 
seek redress of constitutional deprivations by police 
officers who have used excessive force in violation of 
the citizen's constitutionally protected rights. In order 
to maintain a section 1983 action, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that he has suffered a constitutional depri-
vation, the deprivation was the result of an action taken 
under color of state law, and that the constitutional 
deprivation resulted in injury to the plaintiff. 19 
A. THE USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IN APPRE-
HENDING SUSPECTS BY POLICE OFFICERS 
CONSTITUTES A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLA-
TIONENTITLED TO REDRESS UNDER 42 U.S.C. 
SECTION 1983 
At common law, police officers had a privilege to 
misdemeanant. in 1985, however, the United States 
Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner20 changed the 
way in which the use of deadly force by police officers 
against suspects was to be analyzed by holding that the 
apprehension of a criminal suspect "by the use of deadly 
force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment."21 
In determining whether a seizure is reasonable, the 
Garner opinion noted that "[ w]e must balance the 
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's 
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of 
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intru-
sion. "22 The Court noted that "[ t ]he intrusiveness of a 
seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched,"23 and 
therefore, such force is only appropriate when "it is 
necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has 
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a 
significant threat of death or serious physical harm, 
either to the officer or others. "24 Thus, the Court found 
that the reasonableness of the use of deadly force to 
seize a person must be determined through a balancing 
test, considering the totality of the circumstances. 
The Court later extended this analysis to the use of 
non-deadly force by a police officer in apprehending a 
suspect. In Graham v. Connor,25 the Court was con-
fronted with a claim that the police had used excessive 
non-deadly force with a diabetic man during an inves-
tigatory stop. The Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment's reasonableness standard is the proper standard 
for analyzing all claims that police officers have used 
excessive force in making arrests, investigatory stops, 
or other seizures of citizens. 26 The Court added that in 
determining the reasonableness of the force used, the 
analysis must be from the perspective of a reasonable 
officer at the scene "rather than with the 20120 vision 
ofhindsight."27 Furthermore, the Court instructed that 
this test is an objective one, i.e., whether the officers' 
actions were objectively reasonable in light of the 
circumstances confronting them, without considering 
intent or motivation. 28 The Court noted, in assessing the 
reasonableness of the degree of force used by police 
officers, one should consider the severity of the crime 
the suspect allegedly committed, whether the suspect 
posed an immediate danger to the police or others, and 
whether the suspect was resisting or fleeing. 29 
use deadly force when attempting to arrest a fleeing B. A MUNICIPALITY MAY BE LIABLE FOR THE 
felon, but not when attempting to arrest a fleeing USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE BY ITS POLICE 
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OFFICERS IF THE MUNICIPALITY HAS PRO- equals policy, explained that: 
VIDED INADEQUATE TRAINING TO THOSE 
POLICE OFFICERS 
The decisions of Garner and Graham established 
that if excessive force is used by police officers in 
apprehending a suspect, whether such force is deadly or 
not, a Fourth Amendment constitutional violation has 
occurred. Police officers who use excessive force on 
the suspect are liable under section 1983 for damages 
arising from the constitutional violation. 30 Additionally, 
the United States Supreme Court has held that the 
municipality that employs police officers may also be 
liable for the constitutional violation arising from the 
use of excessive force. 31 
In Monell v. Dept. of Social Services,32 the Court 
recognized that, although the doctrine of respondeat 
superior was not available as a method for imposing 
governmental liability under section 1983, local gov-
ernments could be sued when "the action that is alleged 
to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy 
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially 
adopted and promulgated by that body's officer. "33 
The Court, however, did not limit the scope of munic-
ipal liability to only its formally promulgated policies. 
Rather, the Court held that the municipality "may be 
sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to 
governmental' custom' even though such a custom has 
not received formal approval through the body's deci-
sion-making channels."34 The Court, however, was 
clear in its requirement that for the municipality to be 
found liable for the unconstitutional actions of its 
employees, there must be a direct causal link: between a 
municipal policy or custom and the unconstitutional 
harm that was actually suffered. 
Several years later, the Court further expanded the 
liability of municipalities by liberally interpreting what 
constitutes a "policy" or "custom." The Court, in 
Canton v. Harris,35 held that the inadequacy of police 
training may be a basis for section 1983 liability where 
the failure to adequately train amounts to a deliberate 
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the 
police officers come into contact. 36 The Court reasoned 
that "[t]he issue ina case like this one ... is whether that 
training program is adequate; and if it is not, the 
question becomes whether such inadequate training can 
justifiably be said to represent 'city policy. '" 37 The 
Court, in addressing the paradox that a lack of action 
[I]t may happen that in light of the duties 
assigned to specific officers or employ-
ees the need for more or different train-
ing is so obvious, and the inadequacy so 
likely to result in the violation of consti-
tutional rights, that the policy makers of 
the city can reasonably be said to have 
been deliberately indifferent to the need. 
In that event, the failure to provide 
proper training may fairly be said to 
represent a policy for which the city is 
responsible, and for which the city may 
be held liable if it actually causes inju-
ry.38 
Against this legal backdrop, an analysis of the 
Baltimore City Police Department's baton program, 
and the liability and risks associated with the program, 
can be evaluated. The Baltimore City Police Depart-
ment can be held liable for the Department's actual 
excessive force training policies, and for inadequate 
non-deadly force policies and training programs where 
such a deficiency in training demonstrates that the 
Department was deliberately indifferent to the obvious 
constitutional violations likely to result. 
ill. THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPART-
MENT'S BATON PROGRAM - INDICATIVE OF 
THE PROBLEMS AND SECTION 1983 LIABIL-
ITY RISKS INCURRED WITH THE ADOPTION 
OF NON-DEADLY WEAPONRY 
The Baltimore City Police Department recently 
requested an examination of its policies and techniques 
from a consultant who has provided similar services to 
many police departments across the country.39 Robert 
K. Koga, the founder of the Koga Institute, Inc. 
("KOGA"), determined that the Department needed to 
better train its officers in the use of force against 
suspects. KOGA recommended that the Baltimore City 
Police Department replace the 22-inch knurled-ended 
nightstick, presently used by officers, with a 29-inch 
straight baton and that officers undergo KOGA' s train-
ing program on using the baton.40 This new training 
program provided by KOGA has been the subject of 
sharp criticism. Primarily, officers who have gone 
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through the training have noted that the instructors 
emphasize a "two-handed strike aimed at the chest or 
joints," whereas "previous training had officers aiming 
for large muscle mass or the legs. "41 One officer even 
commented that "[t ]his is the most dangerous thing I've 
seen."42 
There appears to be more than a sufficient basis for 
questioning the propriety of this program in light of the 
potential for liability that the program creates for the 
City ofBaltimore. The baton program inBaltimore City 
reflects the general problem with the treatment of non-
deadly weapons and techniques by police departments 
across the country. Inadequate training of police 
officers can be found not only because of the Baltimore 
Police Department' s actual policies and programs, which 
underplay the actual force utilized in their baton tech-
niques, but also for the Department's deliberate indif-
ference to the need for better training of the police 
officers in deciding when the use of non-deadly weap-
ons is appropriate. Both deficiencies have made the 
Baltimore City Police Department, as well as many 
other police departments, ripe for section 1983 liability. 
A. BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S 
BATON TRAINING PROGRAM IS PACKAGED 
AS A NON-DEADLY TECHNIQUE 
The baton techniques that are taught to Baltimore 
City Police Department officers are contained in an 
instructional manual produced by KOGA.43 In the 
manual, KOGA separates the force police officers use 
into three categories: (1) controlling force, (2) injuring 
force, and (3) deadly force. 44 KOGA defines controlling 
force as "physical control ranging all the way from 
exerting a firm grip on an individual through pain 
compliance control holds to an actual physical control 
hold or lock. "45 Injuring force is defined as including 
the use of a "baton or other impact weapon, as well as 
some self-defense tactics."46 Deadly force, on the other 
hand, is defined to include "the use of a weapon or tactic 
that carries with it a substantial risk of death or serious 
bodily injury. "47 
As this breakdown of force indicates, KOGA be-
lieves and teaches that the use of the baton is best 
classified as injuring force, and thus, that the KOGA 
baton techniques are capable of being performed in 
situations calling for less than deadly force. As KOGA 
explains: 
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Police officers have often become con-
fused about when the baton may be used 
in a situation. In most situations, a 
police officer's best defense is weapon-
less control. Other rarer situations call 
for the employment of the firearm. Some-
where in between, however, there may 
be circumstances which require more 
force than can reasonably be applied 
without a weapon, but that fall short of 
calling for a firearm. These are situa-
tions which call for the use of a baton.48 
Specifically, KOGA teaches that police officers can 
consider using the baton when: 
1. They are confronted by an un-
controlled, violently resisting subject, 
or are being attacked in a manner not 
calling for the use of deadly force, and 
they have attempted to or rejected the 
use of lesser force; 
2. The suspect has a similar weap-
on, such as a baton, or perhaps a knife; 
3. The suspect is larger than them, 
and has demonstrated to have superior 
skill and ability; 
4. Tactical considerations such as 
a riot demand immediate control. 49 
While the above situations may in some instances 
actually call for the use of deadly force, KOGA indicates 
that baton strikes can be used even in non-deadly force 
situations. KOGA further conveys its belief in the non-
deadly nature of certain baton techniques through illus-
trations in the manual demonstrating use of these baton 
techniques on an unarmed criminal suspect. 
In regard to the actual baton techniques utilized, 
KOGA establishes a list of preferred areas ofthe body 
that a police officer may strike. The police officers are 
instructed that: 
When striking an aggressor with a ba-
ton, the best target areas are those areas 
where the underlying bone is closest to 
the surface of the skin. Suitable areas 
are those which are easily accessible and 
effective for quickly subduing the ag-
gressor, yet unlikely to cause serious 
injury. In general, these areas are the 
lower legs, arms, chest, midsection, and 
the rib cage. 50 
The method of striking these areas takes two forms: 
thrusting blows and striking blows. Thrusting is defined 
by KOGA as a "one or two-handed jabbing motion, 
employing one rounded end ofthe baton for the strike," 
while striking is defined as a "one or two-hand [ ed] 
strike with the baton, as if cutting with a sword. "51 In 
regard to the injury that could result from such a blow, 
KOGA states that "the aggressor against whom the 
police baton is used will most probably suffer injury, 
albeit usually minor."52 
B. THEBATONST~STOTHECHESTTHAT 
KOGA TEACHES BALTIMORE CITY POLICE 
OFFICERS AS NON-DEADLY FORCE ACTUAL-
L Y CONSTITUTES DEADLY FORCE 
While the United States Supreme Court in Tennes-
see v. Garner held that the use of deadly force was a 
seizure, and thus subject to the Fourth Amendment's 
reasonableness requirement, the Court did not define 
what type offorce constitutes deadly force. The Model 
Penal Code, drafted by the American Law Institute, 
provides a useful definition that has been adopted by 
many courts. 53 It defines deadly force as: 
Force which the actor uses with the 
purpose of causing or which he knows 
to create a substantial risk of causing 
death or serious bodily harm. Purposely 
firing a firearm in the direction of anoth-
er person or at a vehicle in which anoth-
er person is believed to be constitutes 
deadly force. A threat to cause death or 
serious bodily harm, by the production 
of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the 
actor's purpose is limited to creating an 
apprehension that he will use deadly 
force if necessary, does not constitute 
deadly force. 54 
While not all of the baton techniques taught to 
Baltimore City police officers constitute deadly force, 
it is difficult to conceive how the two-handed thrust to 
the chest can be anything but deadly force. The force 
that is exerted from such use of the baton is enormous. 
As a KOGA trained instructor stated, the new baton 
being used "packs a bigger wallop" and "is better 
suited for samurai-sword-like swings, which help the 
officer strike suspects fewer times in areas deemed 
'acceptable targets."'55 One newspaper reporter, on 
assessing the KOGA method, noted that "when swung 
properly, [the baton] can lay a person low without 
drawing blood. It can also shatter a door, break an ax 
handle in half or shatter bones."56 In light of the power 
that police officers can exert with the butt end of the 
baton, especially when using both hands to maximize 
the force, it is obvious that the thrusting baton blows to 
the chest and ribs create a substantial risk of causing 
death or serious bodily harm. 
Indeed, "[s]erious chest injuries are often fatal due 
to the possibility of injury to the lungs, heart and great 
vessels~ and the many types of complications that arise 
from penetrating or blunt traumas to these organs. "57 
The chest, which is enclosed by the ribs, contains the 
heart, lungs, veins and arteries that enter the heart, 
trachea, bronchi (the airways to the lungs) and the 
esophagus. 58 The fracturing or breaking of the ribs 
could result in the puncturing of a lung, which can be 
fatal. 59 Injury to the arteries of the heart can result in 
massive internal bleeding.60 Moreover, a strong blunt 
force directed at the chest can also "fracture four or 
more ribs on the same side and produce a condition 
known as flail chest," a condition where the fractured 
ribs move separately from the rest of the chest area when 
breathing, thereby resulting in breathing difficulty.61 
Hospitalized individuals with "injuries only of the chest 
have a four to eight percent mortality rate. The rate rises 
to ten to fifteen percent when one additional organ 
system is involved, and to thirty-five percent when there 
are multiple-organ-system injuries. "62 In light of all the 
medical complications that can arise from the use of a 
thrusting chest blow, the technique is best considered 
deadly force. Contrary to the assessment made by the 
Baltimore City Police Department, the conclusion that 
a baton strike to the chest is deadly force has been 
reached by the majority of police departments around 
the country. 63 
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C. THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPART-
MENTBATONPROGRAM,BYMISCLASSIFYING 
BATON USE AS NON-DEADLY FORCE AND 
F AILING TO PROVIDE PROPER TRAINING IN 
THE USE OF NON-DEADLY WEAPONS, RUNS 
THE RISK OF CIVIL LIABILITY FOR INADE-
QUATE TRAINING 
There are two main grounds for finding section 
1983 liability against Baltimore City for failing to 
adequately train its police officers. First, the 
misclassification of a baton strike to the chest as non-
deadly force provides ample ground for a jury to 
conclude that the police officer's use of excessive force 
was pursuant to the Department's actual baton policy. 
Second, the lack of training in non-deadly weapons, 
including "live" training, proficiency certification, and 
regular in-service training, could well result in a jury 
finding that Baltimore City inadequately trained its 
officers for the type of split-second judgments that they 
would face in determining the type offorce to use. The 
policy behind instituting such training requirements in 
the use offirearms is just as strong, if not stronger, in the 
context of non-deadly weapons, and failing to provide 
such training could be seen as deliberate indifference. 64 
1. The Misclassification of KOGAs Baton Tech-
niques Provides Grounds for Liability for Inadequate 
Training 
Police officers are generally instructed to use the 
minimum amount of force necessary to subdue a sus-
pect. 65 The proper amount of force is typically judged 
on a "continuum of force," which instructs officers to 
start with little or no force, i.e. verbal commands, and 
if this is ineffective, then to use physical force, such as 
wrist holds and other non-deadly force alternatives, and 
only as a final option to use deadly force. 66 Police 
officers rely on this continuum as guidance in determin-
ing the proper use of force in any given situation they 
face. Nevertheless, the usefulness and "reasonable-
ness" of the continuum depends on the police depart-
ment's proper assessment of the nature of the force in 
a given technique. Thus, by labeling a baton strike to the 
chest as non-deadly when it is properly considered to be 
deadly force, police officers who use this technique will, 
by definition, use excessive force in those situations in 
which the police officers have been instructed to use the 
28 - U. Bait. L.F. 126.2 
baton. 
The history of the use of chokeholds by police 
officers provides an example of the devastating conse-
quences of a police department's misclassification of a 
deadly force technique as non-deadly force. 67 Bor-
rowed from the martial art of judo, the chokehold 
technique has been around for many years.68 The main 
type of chokehold is the "carotid" hold. The carotid 
hold is applied, with the officer behind the person, by 
placing one of the officer's arms around the person's 
neck and holding the wrist of that arm with his other 
hand. Then, by using the muscles in his forearm, the 
officer applies pressure against the carotid arteries on 
the sides of the person's neck. The chokehold is 
designed to stop the flow of blood to the brain by 
applying pressure to the carotic artery, thereby render-
ing the person unconscious.69 
There are many reasons the chokehold poses such 
a threat to victims. First, the technique, given the 
amount offorce applied and the position ofthe arm, can 
result in the officer, even by accident, crushing the 
victim's larynx, trachea, or thyroid, thereby resulting in 
the victim suffering a cardiac arrest or asphyxiation. 70 
Medical experts recognize that even a temporary carot-
id hold can result in serious injury or death. 71 Second, 
because of the violent and frightening nature of such a 
hold, victims will often violently struggle to free them-
selves.72 Such a struggle only encourages the police 
officer to tighten the hold, thereby increasing the risk of 
harm to the person. 
In 1975, the Los Angeles Police Department 
("LAPD") began using the chokehold as a non-deadly 
technique even where the suspect posed no threat of 
violence. 73 Despite the factthat the use ofthe chokehold 
posed a very "high and unpredictable risk of serious 
injury or death," the LAPD officers were never in-
structed that the chokehold could cause death.74 As a 
result, between 1975 and 1980, theLAPD officers used 
the chokehold technique in approximately 975 alterca-
tions with suspects, or approximately 75% of officer-
suspect confrontations.75 As a direct result of the 
chokehold, at least sixteen people died before the 
LAPD, in 1982, recognized the misclassification and 
stopped the practice in situations that called for less than 
deadly force. 76 
The LAPD was not alone in incurring a great deal 
of problems as a result of authorizing the use of 
chokeholds in less-than-deadly force situations. 77 Lia-
bility considerations led the Washington, D.C. Police 
Department and the N ew York City Police Department 
to prohibit the use of chokeholds by police officers, 
except in situations calling for deadly force. 78 Indeed, 
juries have repeatedly found that police officers used 
excessive force where the carotid hold has been applied 
in less than deadly force situations, and that the police 
department and municipality were "deliberately indif-
ferent" in failing to properly train the police officers in 
the nature of the force, and the proper method for 
utilizing such a technique. 
For example, in 1992, a forty-three year old home-
less man was involved in a six-minute physical struggle 
with three police officers until the carotid hold was 
applied. The jury, in awarding the plaintiff's estate 
$470,000, found that the officer applying the hold used 
excessive force, and the Commissioner ofthe California 
Highway Patrol was liable because of his chokehold 
training policies.79 Nevertheless, many citizens in other 
jurisdictions continue to suffer the consequences of the 
chokehold technique when used in non-deadly force 
situations. 80 
The liability risk resulting from inadequate training 
faced by the Baltimore City Police Department is 
strikingly similar to that of police departments that have 
implemented the non-deadly chokehold technique. 
Striking a person in the chest with the butt-end of a 
baton poses such a significant risk of causing death or 
serious injury that a jury would be well supported in 
finding the police department liable for classifying this 
baton technique as non-deadly force. 
2. The Lack of Regular Training and Certification 
Procedures in Non-Deadly Weapons and Techniques 
Provides an Additional Ground for Section 1983 
Liability for Inadequate Training 
Baltimore City runs the risk of facing inadequate 
training claims separate and apart from the issue of 
misclassification of deadly force as non-deadly force. 
Baltimore City, like many other major jurisdictions, has 
concentrated heavily on regulating, training, and certi-
fying police officers on the use of firearms to the point 
where claims against a municipality based on inade-
quate training in the use of firearms are extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to prevail upon. 8) In Mary-
land, minimum requirements for firearm certification 
are set by the Maryland Police Training Commission. 82 
In-service training in the use of firearms includes two 
hours of instruction a year in servicing weapons and 
legal aspects regarding use offirearms. 83 Police officers 
must also pass a proficiency test in firing their service 
weapon annually.84 Additionally, police officers are 
required to have eighteen hours additional job related 
courses, and what is taught during these hours is left to 
the discretion of each individual police department. 85 
Nevertheless, when it comes to policies regarding 
non-deadly weapons, there are no similar in-service 
training or proficiency examination requirements. 86 
Baltimore City is not alone in this respect. Most police 
departments have little or no formal guidelines for the 
use of non-deadly force, nor do these departments 
provide certification or periodic in-service training 
requirements. 81 There are many reasons why the failure 
to require more detailed training, including certification 
and additional in-service requirements may justify the 
imposition of excessive force liability on a municipali-
ty.88 
First, police departments know that officers will be 
called upon to use their weapons in apprehending 
suspects. Police officers need guidance in determining 
when and how it is constitutionally appropriate to use 
the various non-deadly weapons. As the United States 
Supreme Court recognized in the context of firearms 
training: 
[C]ity policy-makers know to a moral 
certainty that their police officers will be 
required to arrest fleeing felons. The 
city has armed its officers with firearms, 
in part to allow them to accomplish this 
task. Thus, the need to train officers in 
the constitutional limitations on the use 
of deadly force ... can be said to be "so 
obvious," that failure to do so could 
properly be characterized as 'deliberate 
indifference' to constitutional rights. 89 
The need for police officers to stay within the constitu-
tionally permissible limits when using non-deadly force 
is no less important and no less obvious. Indeed, an 
officer is much more likely to be required to use non-
deadly force on a suspect than deadly force. 90 Second, 
in order for officers to be properly trained in using a 
technique within constitutional limitations, there must 
be training that occurs under the stress of actual street 
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situations, and not merely out of a textbook or from a 
lecture. Although dealing with the training required in 
the use of firearms, the recent case of Zuchel v. City of 
Denver, 9 I provides an excellent framework for analyz-
ing this liability aspect. 
In Zuchel, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court's refusal to set aside a $330, 000 judgment against 
Denver for inadequate training in the use of deadly 
force. The court relied heavily on expert testimony 
produced at trial which revealed that Denver's District 
Attorney had suggested to the Chief of Police several 
steps to improve the deadly force training of police 
officers.92 Evidence at trial demonstrated that the 
District Attorney recommended that the police depart-
ment institute "live" judgment training, such as a 
"shoot-don't shoot" course, rather than rely on a film 
lecture series on decisional shooting.93 This type of 
judgment training, according to expert testimony pro-
duced at trial, is important because there is no other way 
to teach strategic judgment in the use of force except 
through periodic "shoot-don't shoot" field exercises.94 
Furthermore, the expert stated that the failure of a large 
police department to offer this kind of judgment training 
reflects a deliberate indifference considering the pre-
dictability that officers would face situations where 
such judgment would be called upon. 95 Thus, the expert 
concluded, without periodic judgment training, mis-
takes in the use of force are going to be made.96 In light 
of this evidence, the Tenth Circuit had' no difficulty 
concluding that the evidence was "clearly sufficient" to 
find that the failure to implement periodic judgment 
training "constituted deliberate indifference to the con-
stitutional rights of Denver citizens. "97 Thus, while 
Zuchel concerned the use offirearms, there is an equally 
compelling argument in requiring "live" training in 
non-deadly force weaponry. A police officer usually 
has only a split-second to determine whether a partic-
ular suspect poses a threat, what degree of a threat, and 
what force is proper in response. 98 This is why many 
perceive in-service training on non-deadly weapons, 
including "live" training, as critical in ensuring the 
proper use of force by a police officer. 99 As testimony 
in Zuchel supports, it is predictable that police officers 
who are given non-deadly force weapons will make 
decisions under pressure regarding their use, and not 
training police officers to make judgment calls under 
such stress conditions reflects a deliberate indifference. 
Similarly, although not finding liability for failing to 
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require in-service training, the court in McQurter v. 
City of Atlanta, 100 stressed the essential nature of in-
service training on techniques and weapons. McQurter 
involved the allegation that a police department failed to 
provide in-service training in the use of the chokehold. 
The court, which decided this case several years before 
the United States Supreme Court decided Tennessee v. 
Garner, took great pains to note that no in-service 
training was being provided in a deadly force technique 
such as chokeholds, although such training was being 
provided in firearms. Nevertheless, the court conclud-
ed that the failure to provide in-service training in the 
chokehold did not rise to the level of recklessness or 
gross negligence required for the imposition ofliability. 
The court, however, did hold that the failure to train 
supervisors to deal with such life threatening conduct 
constituted deliberate indifference. The police depart-
ment had promoted supervisors without training them 
on the use of the chokehold, the regulations governing 
its use, or the risks a person may face when subject to 
the chokehold.101 
The requirements of "live" training, annual profi-
ciency certifications, and in-service training should be 
as formal and detailed as required for the use offirearms. 
Superficial requirements would not be sufficient to 
avoid inadequate training liability under section 1983, 
as noted inMcKenzie v. CityofMi/pitas. 102 InMcKenzie, 
the court denied the city's motion for summary judg-
ment on the claim of inadequate training regarding the 
use oftasers.l03 The taser training consisted of giving 
police officers a copy of the city's policy on taser use, 
discussing the policy with the officers, and teaching 
officers to take subjects that have been tasered to the 
emergency room. Moreover, the city not only required 
that officers were not to use tasers without taking a 
training course and passing a written test, but also 
required a mandatory refresher course every year. 104 
Even though these requirements surpass what most 
police departments require today, the court found that 
the city could be held liable for the inadequate training 
of its police officers. Indeed, the plaintiff's allegation 
that the requirements were simply superficial was sup-
ported by evidence that police officers were not told of 
the "constitutional, moral, legal and ethical standards" 
associated with using the taser. 105 Additionally, the 
police officers were never instructed on the dangers of 
prolonged continuation of electrical charges, thereby 
encouraging officers to use the taser continually until 
the suspect complies. Finally, it was alleged that the 
written test on proper taser use was designed to be 
passed, as demonstrated by the fact that no officer had 
ever failed the test. 106 After the District Court denied the 
city's motion for summary judgment, the jury found that 
the City had inadequately trained its police officers in 
the use ofthe taser and awarded the victim $200,000. 107 
The inadequacy of superficial training requirements 
was further stressed in Russo v. City oj Cincinnati, 108 
where the Sixth Circuit addressed a claim that the city 
had failed to adequately train its officers to deal with 
mentally ill individuals, and this failure proximately 
caused the shooting death of a paranoid schizophrenic. 
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
for the city, the Sixth Circuit explained that sufficient 
evidence was produced to generate a material dispute as 
to whether the city's training in deadly force amounted 
to deliberate indifference, and therefore, a failure to 
adequately train. The court noted that testimony showed 
that while there was some initial training on handling 
mentally ill individuals, in-service training for dealing 
with the mentally ill was non-existent. 109 Expert testi-
mony revealed that "none of the involved police per-
sonnel understood the appropriate procedure for react-
ing to mentally ill individuals."I1° The court found that 
offering a seven-hour course on "Disturbed-Distress 
Persons" was insufficient in and of itself to shield the 
city from liability. 111 
Inadequate training liability, therefore, could be 
imposed based on the Baltimore City Police Depart-
ment's failure to provide more sophisticated training in 
non-deadly weapons. Such a lack of training is known 
to cause a substantial risk of constitutional violations 
because police officers will be less capable of properly 
and safely utilizing the weapon. The most innocuous 
devices can become problematic when a municipality 
fails to offer the annual certification and in-service 
training for such weapons. Moreover, police officers 
without such training tend to become much more 
indiscriminate in the use of non-deadly weapons, which 
often leads to the over use of the weapon. 112 This lack 
of training can even tum otherwise non-deadly weapons 
into deadly ones. 113 
A prime example ofthe problems associated with a 
lack of training is reflected in the use of pepper spray. 
Pepper spray is an oily plant resin that is derived from 
dried spices such as chili. 114 Pepper spray is considered 
by law enforcement agencies to be a proper force after 
the police officer's verbal commands fail to control the 
suspect, but before hands-on type contact such as a 
baton is utilized. liS When pepper spray is used on a 
person, that person's airways tend to restrict, his eyelids 
swell, and he feels a burning sensation on his skin and 
membranes of the mouth and nose for approximately 
twenty minutes. 116 The use ofthis spray, because of its 
seemingly non-injurious nature, is widespread among 
police departments, including Baltimore City's. 117 
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") has 
recently complained that police officers have become 
"increasingly indiscriminate [about the use of pepper 
spray] despite written expressions of' grave scientific 
concern' by the Environmental Protection Agency re-
garding its safety."118 The sometimes free use of the 
device can be problematic. 119 For example, in Califor-
nia, police officers used pepper spray 9,000 times over 
the last year, at a rate of twenty-four times a dayYo The 
ACLU has recently petitioned the United States Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission to regulate the use 
of pepper spray by noting that twenty-seven criminal 
suspects have died over the last two and one-half years 
in California, and an estimated sixty-one people have 
perished nationwide, after being subdued with pepper 
spray by police officers. 121 Although the exact cause of 
death of these victims was difficult to determine, a large 
proportion of the victims had underlying heart or respi-
ratory problems suggesting that the use of the spray 
could have been a "serious complicating factor. "122 
Assessing the harm caused by pepper spray is 
complicated by the fact that law enforcement officials 
will not evaluate their pepper spray training programs 
unless definitive proof of the causal connection between 
pepper spray and these deaths is produced. Law 
enforcement agencies have been lulled into a false sense 
of security by relying on studies that have shown that no 
"long-term health risks" have been found as a result of 
using the spray.123 Also, pepper spray manufacturers, 
with a great deal at stake, contend that there is little or 
no evidence that pepper spray caused any of the sixty-
one deaths, pointing to the fact that medical examiners 
only cited pepper spray as a factor in two of the 
deaths. 124 
The ACLU has argued that police departments 
must begin to implement regulations and training pro-
grams to teach officers about the length of time a person 
can be sprayed, the danger that use of the spray can 
cause to some individuals, especially high risk groups 
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such as drug users and those with respiratory problems, 
and the need for providing medical attention after 
someone is sprayed. 125 Furthermore, instruction on the 
effects of combining non-deadly force techniques should 
be carefully analyzed, and appropriate policy formulat-
ed. Presently, this type of training is simply not taking 
place in most police departments around the country. 
The debate over the effects of pepper spray is 
indicative of the problems associated with the use of 
non-deadly force. Police departments have been very 
reluctant to impose any restrictions or effective guide-
lines on the proper use of pepper spray by police 
officers. While the causal connection between the use 
of pepper spray and death has not been conclusively 
proven, there is evidence that the effects of pepper spray 
tend to be aggravated by police officers' use of other 
non-deadly techniques in conjunction with pepper spray, 
such as stun guns, handcuffs, and manual holds. 126 This 
is not to say that police officers should discontinue the 
use of pepper spray, but rather, they must recognize that 
the use of all non-deadly weapons and techniques run 
the risk of significant injury or death. Accordingly, civil 
liability for inadequate training may result if police 
departments fail to investigate the potential for harm in 
the non-deadly weapons they use and refuse to increase 
training through the use of "live" training, proficiency 
certification, and in-service training in these weapons. 
Additionally, the indiscriminate use of the non-deadly 
weapons that accompany the lack of such training is a 
cause of grave concern. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Non-deadly weapons hold a great deal of promise 
for avoiding the risk of injury to police officers and 
suspects during confrontation, thereby substantially 
decreasing the threat of civil liability . Nevertheless, this 
promise has not been fully realized primarily because 
police departments have failed to appreciate that signif-
icant injury or death, can result from the use of these 
non-deadly weapons and techniques. Specifically, the 
systematic undervaluing ofthe degree offorce posed by 
the use of these weapons, and the failure to recognize 
the need for "live" training, proficiency certification, 
and in-service training in the use of these weapons has 
increased the risk that the use of a non-deadly weapon 
or technique will be excessive, increasing the risk of civil 
liability to the officer, the department, and the munici-
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pality involved. 
Much of the liability concerns could be eliminated if 
police departments, such as the Baltimore City Police 
Department, imposed the same training requirements 
for non-deadly weapons as these departments have 
done with firearms. The policy justifications for man-
dating extensive proficiency and in-service training 
requirements in regard to non-deadly weapons are just 
as strong, ifnot more so, than in the context offirearms. 
The use of "shoot-don't shoot" type training in non-
deadly weapons would not only diminish the threat of 
liability faced by police departments, but such training 
would give police officers greater confidence and pro-
ficiency in using the weapons under stressful condi-
tions. The need for such "live" training in the use of 
non-deadly weapons is best supported by the fact that 
most physical confrontations faced by police officers 
will not call for deadly force, but rather, will require the 
officers to make the difficult, split-second assessment of 
what level of non-deadly force is appropriate. By 
making the training in non-deadly weaponry more 
extensive, and by carefully evaluating the level of force 
a particular weapon or technique imposes, the police 
departments will not only better protect its officers and 
citizens from unnecessary physical injury, but protect 
the municipality from unnecessary civil liability. 
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